Europe is in grave danger if Trump hands victory to Putin in Ukraine

According to anonymous sources quoted in The Washington Post, one of Donald Trump’s first actions on being re-elected was to call Vladimir Putin. That call was immediately denied by the Kremlin. As Trump moves back into power, we should get used to confusion and mixed messaging – between him and Vladimir Putin, it’s always going to be hard to tell which, if either, might actually be telling the truth on any given occasion.
In fact, Russia’s response to the return of Trump has been a similarly confusing mixture of shameless flattery and blatant trolling. Putin’s comments on “courageous” Trump were accompanied by Russia’s primetime television propaganda show welcoming Trump to the White House by airing nude photographs of his wife from a quarter-century ago while its presenters smirked.
That’s led to speculation over how the relationship might have moved on since Trump’s first term in office. But long-term Russia analysts consider this kind of power play “normal for Putin” – particularly when the target of the information campaign has shown himself as easy to manipulate as Trump.
Putin may want to make it look as though Trump has come begging, but will still make his man in the White House look good in the end. The bigger issue is what that means for the war on Ukraine – and how that affects the whole of Europe.
It’s true that the supposed phone call would have been out of character. In it, Trump is reported to have taken a firm line with Putin, warning him not to escalate in Ukraine and reminding him of the US’s substantial military presence in Europe. That’s the opposite of Trump’s public attitude to date, or with what he and his team have said about Ukraine or about that same military presence.
Trump has repeatedly said he could end the war on Ukraine “in one day” if re-elected. That’s been widely taken to mean he’d force Volodymyr Zelensky to capitulate and reward Putin for the invasion by granting him the territory he wants to seize.
There’s no official “Trump peace plan” as yet; but unsurprisingly, the most specific proposals seen to date are close to what Russia wants, and catastrophic for Ukraine.
Also unsurprisingly, Russia has given no hint that it’s open to a compromise deal that gives it less than total control over Ukraine’s future. But even a temporary ceasefire would suit Putin perfectly. There’s no expectation that Russia would observe the terms of a ceasefire, but even so, it gives Moscow the opportunity to continue to build up its forces for when fighting resumes.
Trump’s grand plan will also have to deal with the inconvenient fact that Ukraine wants to survive. Forcing Kyiv into compliance may simply not be possible if it means crippling the country’s chances of withstanding the next Russian onslaught.
And proposals for Ukraine to give up land to Russia to buy peace customarily overlook the fact that this means human beings, not just “territory”, and that kind of deal means abandoning the south and east of the country to savage Russian military occupation indefinitely. It’s because the front-line states neighbouring Russia know what that means from their own experience that they are such staunch supporters of Ukrainian resistance.
The incoming Trump administration does have powerful tools available to influence Russia if it wants to. Lifting the ban on long-range strikes into Russia with Western munitions, and closing sanctions loopholes through which Russia still receives energy income to drive its war machine, are just two levers that the Biden administration consistently refused to pull.
But the bigger question is what the United States might use those levers for – to arrive at a solution that’s tolerable for Ukraine and positive for the safety of Europe, or one that looks good for Trump, and for America, makes the problem go away, at least temporarily.
For Europe, an end to the fighting in Ukraine makes the danger from Russia much greater, not less. European and North American intelligence and defence chiefs are unanimous that Russia is preparing to mount an attack against a Nato state in the near future.
Where there is disagreement though is not over whether Russia will attack, but where and when. The unexpected speed with which Russia has been rebuilding its land forces has triggered a spate of warnings across the continent to prepare for conflict more urgently.
And as soon as Ukraine is no longer demolishing those forces on the front line, Russia will be able to rebuild and re-equip them much faster – including with manpower pressed into service from Ukraine’s occupied territories, and now reinforcements from North Korea.
The end of the current fighting in Ukraine will not bring “peace” without effective means of deterring Russia from starting another war.
At present, it’s an open question whether even the strongest European military powers possess those means without US support. For over a decade, Ukraine has held the front line for Europe against Russia’s plans for reclaiming its former dominions, at immense and tragic cost. That has bought time for the rest of Europe to prepare to meet the threat itself.
But as I discovered when researching my new book Who Will Defend Europe?, with the exception of front-line states like Finland, Poland and the Baltic states, most of the continent has squandered the opportunity.
In the UK in particular, the yawning gap between words and action under the current government and the previous one will be a source of lasting shame when the country’s ability to defend itself is put to the test. And that moment will be much closer if Ukraine is forced into submission with Trump’s help.
Keir Giles is an author and a senior consulting fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House